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COVID-19	and	housing:	while	prices	may	fall,	homes
will	remain	unaffordable
Discussing	the	potential	effects	of	COVID-19	on	housing,	Paul	Cheshire	and	Christian
Hilber	write	that	real	house	prices	and	rents	may	initially	fall.	Yet	housing	will	remain
unaffordable	for	the	young	and	those	on	lower	incomes,	especially	in	London	and	the
South	East,	as	this	fall	will	be	driven	by	a	fall	in	earnings.
To	speculate	usefully	about	the	effects	of	COVID-19	on	UK	housing	one	needs	a	clear
analytical	understanding	of	how	our	housing	markets	work	and	what	forces	cause	them	to	change.	Given	the
extreme	uncertainty	about	the	impact	and	evolution	of	the	pandemic,	anything	in	this	blog	is	in	some	sense
speculation,	but	we	hope	informed	speculation.
A	recent	academic	paper	analysing	the	impacts	on	house	prices	and	rents	of	historic	epidemics	in	Amsterdam	and
Paris	found	only	relatively	short-lived	and	localised	reductions	in	house	prices	and	smaller	effects	on	rents	than	on
prices.	While	useful,	we	are	cautious	about	trying	to	draw	direct	lessons	from	such	historic	examples:	not	least
because	the	extent	of	lockdown	and	disruption	now	is	an	order	of	magnitude	greater.	COVID-19	is	a	true	pandemic,
affecting	the	whole	interdependent	world	economy	at	the	same	time.	Moreover,	beyond	its	intrinsically	lower	fatality
rate,	modern	medical	understanding	about	the	spread	of	disease	together	with	greater	societal	emphasis	on	saving
lives,	are	likely	to	mean	much	lower	death	rates	from	COVID-19	than	from	the	Black	Death	or	the	cholera	epidemic
in	19th	century	Paris,	but	disproportionately	greater	economic	impact.
Apart	from	applying	basic	analytical	tools	it	is	also	probably	useful	to	look	at	the	impacts	in	terms	of	three	time
horizons:	the	short	term	(over	the	next	six	to	nine	months);	the	medium	term	(up	to	about	2024);	and	the	long	term
(over	the	next	ten-plus	years).	And,	a	warning,	the	further	ahead	one	looks	the	more	uncertainty	attaches	to	one’s
predictions.	But	we	will	do	our	best.
The	short	term
Britons	have	become	conditioned	to	expect	rising	house	prices	in	real	terms.	After	all	they	have	increased	fivefold
since	the	1950s,	faster	than	in	any	other	OECD	country.	This	rise	has	been	driven	mainly	by	rising	real	incomes
and	an	increasingly	fixed	supply	of	housing	in	large	parts	of	the	country.	The	supply	of	new	houses	is	so	inflexible
because	our	planning	system	is	dysfunctional	and	our	system	of	local	government	finance	provides	virtually	no
incentives	for	local	authorities	to	permit	development	(see	here,	here	or	here).	It	is	rising	real	incomes	that	fuel	the
demand	for	‘housing	services’	(reflected	in	rents)	but	part	of	what	fuels	the	demand	for	housing	as	an	asset	is	rising
house	prices	relative	to	the	price	of	other	assets.	And	this,	in	turn,	given	the	nearly	fixed	supply	of	houses,	may	fuel
further	price	rises.
So	this	is	the	first	pointer	to	what	the	COVID-19	crisis	will	do	to	the	housing	market.	In	the	very	short	term,	it	will
produce	stasis:	buying	and	selling	will	all	but	stop.	Indeed,	they	already	have	–	even	in	early	April	Zoopla	reported	a
40%	drop	in	enquiries.	Even	when	the	lockdown	is	over	and	the	market	‘unfreezes’,	the	transaction	volume	is	likely
to	fall	substantially.	In	part	this	will	be	because	households	are	loss	averse	and	not	likely	to	want	to	realise	a	loss;
but	also	because	of	the	probable	ongoing	economic	disruption	discussed	below.	As	WHO	spokesman	David
Nabarro	claimed	on	April	12,	the	‘virus	will	stalk	us	for	years	to	come,	changing	behaviour	for	the	foreseeable
future’.	So	prices	will	tend	to	fall,	especially	as	incomes	disappear	for	large	numbers	of	people,	triggering,	in	some
cases,	real	financial	distress	and	near	forced	sales.
While	construction	of	new	houses	will	be	severely	restricted,	because	new	homes	are	such	a	small	fraction	of	the
total	stock,	this	will	make	little	difference	to	total	supply,	so	will	do	little	to	offset	the	fall	in	house	prices.	Moreover,
the	vast	majority	of	COVID-19-induced	deaths	over	the	next	few	years	will	be	of	elderly	people,	freeing	up	some
existing	stock	and	thus	reinforcing,	slightly,	the	temporary	downward	trend	in	house	prices.	Overall,	the	supply	side
effect	on	house	prices	may	be	rather	muted	as	the	two	effects	(on	construction	and	freed	stock)	may	largely	offset
each	other.
Thus,	in	the	short	term,	three	things	mainly	matter:
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1.	 How	far	will	lenders	be	willing	–	even	be	able	–	to	flex	to	minimise	the	number	of	forced	sales?	Forced	sales
quickly	translate	into	falling	house	prices	as	we	saw	in	1991;
2.	 How	catastrophically	will	borrowers’	incomes	be	hit	and	for	how	long?
3.	 How	much	and	for	how	long	will	real	incomes	fall?
We	can	offer	no	professional	forecast	as	to	how	long	the	epidemic	or	the	lockdown	will	last.	Maybe	the	UK
lockdown	will	continue	till	early	June,	two	months	after	the	start	of	the	easing	in	China.	But	even	then,	the	easing
will	be	gradual	and	the	resumption	of	normal	economic	activity	will	take	probably	many	months.	Moreover,	if	the
Spanish	flu-pandemic	that	lasted	from	January	1918	to	December	1920	is	any	indication	(see	here	and	here),	it	is
likely	there	will	be	a	second	and	possibly	even	third	wave,	depending	on	how	quickly	a	vaccine	can	be	developed
and	made	available.
The	longer	the	lockdown	lasts,	the	slower	the	recovery	will	be.	The	economy	appears	to	be	in	freefall.	Official	data
was	hardly	yet	available	but	there	was	an	ingenious	review	of	current	indicators	in	the	Financial	Times	on	8	April:
car	sales	down	44%	in	March;	restaurant	bookings	on	Open	Table	–	a	sort	of	forward	indicator	–	dropped	to	zero
two	days	before	the	official	lockdown.	Nothing	since	the	OBR	14	April	report	has	been	less	gloomy.	It	is	clear	that
recovery	from	the	initial	near	catastrophic	hit	is	dependent	on	businesses	being	able	to	re-set.	But	it	looks
increasingly	likely	that	many	businesses	will	not	survive.	The	physical	fabric	will	survive,	but	the	government’s
initiative	to	provide	emergency	finance	seems	plagued	by	delay	and,	while	loans	do	not	come,	more	and	more
businesses	will	go	under.	Recovery	will	be	much	slower	if	the	businesses	themselves	have	to	be	re-invented	and
established	anew.	Demand	may	be	there	and	so	may	the	workers	but	there	have	to	be	businesses	to	organise	the
process	of	production	and	employment.
The	medium	term
Turning	to	the	medium	term,	we	first	note	that	the	longer	the	lockdown	and	the	more	businesses	go	under,	the
slower	the	bounce-back	is	likely	to	be.	The	slower	the	bounce-back,	the	slower	the	recovery	in	the	demand	for
housing	–	driven	by	earnings	–	will	be.	And	even	when	earnings	start	to	recover,	the	savings	of	many	will	have
been	depleted.	Would-be	buyers	will	find	much	of	what	they	had	set	aside	for	deposits,	whether	for	first	purchase	or
to	trade-up,	will	have	gone	on	essential	supplies	to	keep	the	household	afloat	while	incomes	were	down.	Moreover,
existing	owners’	capital	gains	from	their	current	homes	will	have	fallen,	reducing	their	ability	to	make	a	sizeable
deposit	on	their	typically	larger	and	more	expensive	trade-up	homes.
Buying	a	home	will	have	to	be	postponed	again,	even	if	prices	appear	to	be	more	affordable.	It	took	till	1945	for	real
house	prices	to	get	back	to	their	1931	levels:	it	took	till	late	2001	to	get	back	to	1989	real	prices.	House	prices	may
have	increased	nearly	fivefold	since	1955	but	there	have	been	booms,	busts	and	prolonged	troughs	along	the	way.
We	would	not	be	surprised	to	find	real	house	prices	in	2024	well	below	present-day	levels.	The	economic	downturn
triggered	by	COVID-19	may	even	equal	that	of	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s.	However,	construction	of	social
housing	may	have	a	bit	of	a	revival.
Lower	house	prices	will	not	improve	affordability	in	the	medium	term,	however,	since	the	cause	would	be	lower
incomes	and	depleted	savings.
The	long	term
So	what	of	the	long	term?	To	2030	and	beyond.	Here	we	get	even	more	speculative	but	we	will	assume	that	the
pandemic	dies	away	and	the	economy	eventually	recovers.	The	pandemic	could	even	trigger	an	innovation	boost
e.g.	in	communication	technology	(which	might	damage	the	recovery	of	airlines	and	ground	transport)	or	medicine.
And,	although	we	have	long	argued	for	radical	reforms	to	those	policies	impeding	building	more	houses	where
people	want	to	live	(such	as	releasing	Green	Belt	land	around	commuter	stations	or	reforming	the	tax	system	to
incentivise	local	authorities	to	permit	development),	we	will	reluctantly	assume	there	are	none,	at	least	no
meaningful	ones.	One	of	the	downsides	of	our	expected	prolonged	depression	in	real	house	prices	is	that	it	may
take	the	pressure	off	politicians	to	reform	our	dysfunctional	housing	supply.
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If	this	is	true,	construction	will	stay	well	below	the	level	needed	to	satisfy	demand,	so	prices	will	take	off	when
incomes	finally	recover.	However,	the	structure	of	demand	may	change.	Already	there	is	talk	of	how	we	will	not	go
back	to	what	we	were	doing	before	COVID-19	struck.	People	may	adjust	to	more	home-working,	including
commuting	to	a	central	office	far	less	frequently.	This	would	have	two	implications	(apart	from	those	it	would	have
for	the	demand	for	office	space):	the	first	would	be	that	people	would	demand	more	space	in	their	houses;	the
second	is	that	commuting	costs	might	become	less	important	as	an	influence	on	where	people	choose	to	live.
These	would	suggest	a	movement	outwards	to	find	cheaper	land	and	space,	and	accept	the	longer	commute	that
implied.	In	fact	before	COVID-19	struck	there	was	already	evidence	of	people	jumping	the	Green	Belt	so	this	would
be	a	continuation	of	an	existing	trend.
Although	not	strictly	following,	a	further	related	trend	might	be	for	higher-paid	jobs	to	concentrate	even	more
strongly	in	the	first-order	cities,	notably	London,	Manchester,	Edinburgh,	even	Leeds,	at	the	expense	of	second-tier
cities	like	Stoke-on-Trent,	Derby	or	Coventry;	and	demand	for	housing	to	relatively	increase	in	smaller	but	well-
connected	high-amenity	cities	like	Cambridge,	Canterbury,	Exeter,	Harrogate,	Hexham,	Norwich	or	Oxford,	further
increasing	house	price	pressures	in	these	locations.
Conclusion
While	there	is	huge	uncertainty	surrounding	the	COVID-19	crisis,	one	thing	is	clear:	it	is	likely	to	have	lasting	effects
on	both	Britain’s	housing	markets	and	housing	policies.	Real	house	prices	(and	rents)	may	fall	in	the	short	and
medium	term	without	making	housing	less	unaffordable.	It	will	remain	particularly	unaffordable	for	the	young	and
those	on	lower	incomes,	especially	in	London	and	the	South	East,	and	for	other	people	and	sectors	hardest-hit	by
COVID-19.	When	it	comes	to	housing	policies,	policymakers	(of	all	colours)	would	be	well-advised	not	to	jump	on
the	populist	band-wagon.	There	needs	to	be	a	policy	reaction	reflecting	the	true	causes	rather	than	the	symptoms
of	the	affordability	crisis	and	the	longer-term	reforms	that	are	the	only	way	of	truly	resolving	our	housing	problems.
We	need	to	learn	from	Germany,	not	just	in	terms	of	effective	testing	for	COVID-19,	but	also	from	their	housing	and
planning	policies.
__________________
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